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Climate change, securitisation of nature and resilient urbanism 
 
Abstract  
Climate change is a powerful reminder of the interdependencies of human-nature relationship 
and the fallacy of the modernist assumption about our ability to tame nature for our 
exploitation with little or no consequences. However, this paper argues that such reflexivity is 
being subverted by the dominant discourses of climate change which portray: nature as risk, 
our relation to it in terms of security and, the quest for urban resilience as emergency 
planning. By construing nature as a threat to rather than an asset for cities, they signify a 
departure from sustainability discourses. They represent hark back to a pre-modern 
conception of human-nature relations that was centred on what nature does to us rather than 
what we do to nature. Seeing nature as risk ushers in deep concerns with security. The ‘risk 
society’ becomes entwined with security society. The paper examines the political 
implications of this discursive shift and argues that as securitization becomes the hegemonic 
discourse of our time, the postpolitics of hope, which underpinned sustainability, is giving 
way to the postpolitics of fear which underlies climate change.  
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1. Introduction 
We are frequently reminded that the 21
st
 century is the first urban century. For the first time 
in history, the majority of the world’s population live in cities and by 2050 three out of four 
people will be urban dwellers.   What is less frequently rehearsed is that the urban age is the 
prevailing manifestation of ‘the age of man’ or, as the Dutch atmospheric chemist Paul 
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Crutzen
1
 calls it, the ‘Anthropocene’. The idea is that we no longer live in Holocene, a 
10,000-year-old geological epoch of relative climate stability
2
. That, we have entered a 
paradigmatically different epoch called the ‘age of man’ in which “dam by dam, mine by 
mine, farm by farm and city by city” humans have remade nature (The Economist, 2011:3). 
For the first time in history, human activities have brought about planetary changes whose 
significance is on par with geological forces. As McKibben (1989:8) asserts, “we are at the 
end of Nature” by which he does not mean the end of the world but, the end of “nature as 
eternal and separate”. In the Anthropocene, what was once non-human nature has been turned 
into “something contingent and coincident with human society” (Luke, 1999:10). A 
compelling evidence of this is the reconfiguration of the planet’s carbon cycle by 
anthropogenic release of quantities of fossil carbon over the past couple of centuries that took 
the planet hundreds of millions of years to store away. This is now causing global warming, 
sea level rise, melting of the Arctic, changes to oceans’ chemistry, and all that which is 
attributed to climate change.  
 
Climate change has unravelled, perhaps more than any other environmental change, the 
intimate and inescapable interdependencies between human and non-human nature (hereafter 
called nature).  It has revealed our complex and precarious relationship with nature and the 
fallacy of the modernist assumption about our ability to conquer and exploit nature with little 
or no consequences. It has led to “growing scepticism” about “advances on knowledge and 
technology” (EC, 2000:5) which, as some commentators argue, have washed away “a certain 
set of human ideas about the world and our place in it” (McKibben, 1989:8). The main 
argument of this paper is that such awareness and reflexive environmentalism is increasingly 
                                                          
1
 He shared a Nobel Prize for discovering the effects of ozone-depleting compounds and is credited with coining 
the term Anthropocene in a conference in 2000. 
2
 This is stable and temperate part of the quaternary period which was a distinguished by regular shifts into and 
out of ice ages.  
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displaced by the dominating discourses of climate change which portray nature as risk and 
frame our relationship to it in terms of security. It is also argued that by construing nature as a 
risk to, rather than a finite asset for cities, they mark a departure from sustainability 
discourses. The focus is shifting from seeing nature as a resource to be sustained for cities to 
considering nature as a threat against which cities are to be secured. This securitisation of 
nature has profound implications for how the environment is treated and valued, what kinds 
of environmental policies are formulated, and what types of environmental politics are 
mobilised. As Botkin (1990) suggests, “the potential for us to make progress with 
environmental issues is limited by the basic assumptions that we make about nature, the 
unspoken, often unrecognized perspective from which we view our environment”. 
 
The paper is divided into five main sections. After this introduction, section two provides an 
overview of the evolving meanings of nature. Section three examines the risk-laden language 
of climate change and the securitisation of nature, focusing in particular on two referent 
objects that dominate climate security discourses: cities and nations. Section four discusses 
the emerging postpolitics of securitization, arguing that while climate change is underpinned 
by a similar consensual politics to that of sustainability, its rhetoric is shifting from the 
postpolitics of hope to the postpoltics of fear. Section five concludes the paper.  
 
2. Multiple meanings of nature  
“Every age has its own unique view of nature, its own interpretation of what the world 
is all about. Knowing a civilisation’s concept of Nature is tantamount to knowing how 
a civilisation thinks and acts.” (Rifkin, 1983: 20) 
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Although there are multiple, conflicting and contested meanings of ‘nature’, it is possible to 
distinguish between two broad perspectives: the anthropocentric and the bio-centric. The 
anthropocentric perspective places humans at the centre of Universe and nature at their 
service. As the Anthropocene is the defining geological age of our time, so is the 
anthropocentric perspective its defining environmental ethics.  From this human-centred 
view, nature has instrumental values. It is a means to other ends, or as maintained by 
Aristotle, “nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man” (cited in Brennan and 
Yeuk-Sze, 2011).  This is in contrast to the bio-centric perspective which considers humans 
as members of an interconnected ‘web of life’ (Marshall, 1994) and an integral part of nature, 
rather than its master or steward. From the bio-centric perspective nature has intrinsic values. 
It is an end in itself. Although the bio-centric view predates the anthropocentric one, it has 
remained subservient to it since the Enlightenment era. Within the dominant anthropocentric 
perspective three meanings of nature that have been particularly influential. First is nature as 
clockwork which imbued modernity and its desire to conquer nature. Second is nature as 
finite asset that permeates the reflexive environmentalism of the sustainability agenda. And, 
third is nature as risk which legitimises the securitisation of climate change. Elsewhere, I 
have explored how these world views have been articulated in policy discourses of spatial 
plans in the UK (Davoudi, 2012a). Below, a consolidation of that work is presented in order 
to lay the foundation for the argument in favour of the discursive shift and its political 
implications.  
 
2.1 Nature as clockwork  
Seeing nature as a mechanical machine became dominant after the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth century and particularly the rise of Newtonian mechanics. It replaced the 
previous meaning of nature as a metaphysical order with a divine origin and instead portrayed 
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it as a machine whose behavior could be predicted by mathematical rules and monitored by 
command and control systems (Botkin, 1990).  It was believed that by uncovering the secrets 
of nature through instrumental reason, humans could conquer the clockwork Universe and 
overcome its material scarcity. By stripping nature from its divinity and symbolic values, 
science and technology gave humans both the means and the right to exploit it (Bowler, 
1992). Francis Bacon’s assertion sums up these anthropocentric views of the world:   
“Man, […] may be regarded as the centre of the world […] For the whole world 
works together in the service of man, and there is nothing from which he does not 
derive use and fruit […] insomuch that all things seem to going about man’s business 
and not their own” (cited in Marshall, 1994: 184).         
 
The Enlightenment project was, thus, driven by a desire not just to explore nature, but also to 
exploit it (Bowler, 1992; Cronon, 1995); a desire which was materialized on an industrial 
scale in the nineteenth century. Cities in the western societies turned into fossil-fueled 
powerhouses of the Industrial Revolution which brought wealth for some, misery for others 
and left behind unprecedented environmental scars notably the reconfiguration of the Earth’s 
carbon cycle. As Jameson (1991: ix) argues, one manifestation of the completion of the 
modernism project is that “Nature is gone for good”, and “what was once God’s wild Nature” 
has become “technoscientific managerialists’ tamed ecosystem” (Luke 1997: 9 drawing on 
Grubb et al, 1983) which is out there to provide us with:  a storehouse of material resources 
to be mined, a sink for absorbing waste and pollution, a container of goods, a repository of 
functional services, a source of aesthetic pleasure, and a backcloth for urban development 
(Davoudi, 2012a). While the mechanical view of nature was challenged as early as the 
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nineteenth century by, for example, the Romantic movements
3
 in Europe, the functional 
utilitarian approach to it continued to define the treatment of the environment in urban policy 
and planning in the UK (Davoudi, 2012a). Furthermore, the initial welfare orientation has 
been increasingly turned into commodification and marketization, a trend which is now 
intensified by the discourses of ‘ecosystems goods and services’ (MEA, 2005). Open spaces, 
for example, which were seen as the ‘green lungs’ for the cities of the twentieth century are 
now assigned with new functions and services such as: cooling ambient temperature, draining 
flood waters, storing carbon, and ‘weatherproofing’ cities.  As Higgins (2012:30) suggests, 
by putting price tags on nature “we are […] commoditising the Earth. […] We create more 
property rights over Nature, and markets take precedence over the intrinsic value of land”.  
We return to this commodification trend in the discussion about risk and security, below.       
 
2.2 Nature as finite asset 
While Romanticism has been considered by some as an elitist attempt to preserve “the 
environmental artefacts” “for ‘the Nation’, but from ‘the public’” (Newby, 1990:6), the 
challenge posed by the environmental consciousness of the mid-twentieth century was more 
widespread.  In the 1960s the idea that nature could be exploited with no consequences began 
to be contested.  Nature turned into a set of ‘environmental problems’ for which specialised, 
techno-scientific solution had to be found and implemented through environmental 
management and regulation (Dryzek, 1997). The emphasis was shifting from what we could 
get out of nature to what we had done to it and what could be done to rectify the damage.  
The impetus was mixed ranging from the material impacts of environmental catastrophes
4
, to 
the symbolic influences of seeing the Earth from the space and to the alarming messages of 
                                                          
3
 For example, John Constable and William Turner, the British Romantic painters, who considered nature as a 
source of inspiration; and, William Blake for whom nature was where the industry was not (Williams, 1972); it 
was ‘England's green and pleasant land’ that was endangered by the ‘dark Satanic Mills’ (Milton: a poem  
1808). 
4 Such as the widely publicized  Minamata disease in Japan and the Love Canal in New York  
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Rachael Carson’s Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) and The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth 
(Meadows et al, 1972). The latter, produced by a team of scientists and computer modellers, 
was particularly influential in provoking the discourse of survivalism which resonated with 
the earlier carrying capacity concerns of ecologists (Dryzek, 1997) and the Malthusian 
anxieties of population biologists. Indeed, some referred to the Club of Rome as ‘Malthus 
With a Computer’ (Freeman, 1973).  Although survivalism was rendered a seal of approval 
by the discovery of a ‘hole’ in the ozone layer, its salience was sidelined by the Brundtland 
Report (WCSD, 1989) and its promise of a win-win, sustainable development solution to 
environmental problems. The Report asserted that, “Growth has no set limits in terms of 
population or resources use beyond which lies ecological disaster” (WCSD, 1989:45) 
because, the “accumulation of knowledge and the development of technology can enhance 
the carrying capacity of the resources base” (WCSD, 1989: 45). Its confidence in humans to 
“have the ingenuity to change” (WCSD, 1989: 205) and its rhetoric of a positive-sum relation 
between growth and environment played a major part in its widespread currency. Its message 
was a reassuring one: “we can see and study the Earth as an organism” and that would give us 
“the power to reconcile human affairs with natural laws and to thrive in the processes” 
(WCSD, 1989:1). The rhetoric of sustainability - eternalised in Brundtland’s definition of 
sustainable development- reimagines nature as a finite asset which should and could be 
safeguarded for the generations to come.  Its focus is less on limits and more on capacities; 
and less on apocalyptic futures in which humans’ survival is threatened and more on 
promising futures in which humans flourish alongside a sustainable and tamed ecosystem.  
 
This paper argues that the reflexive environmentalism which imbued the sustainability 
agenda is increasingly displaced by the dominant discourses of climate change that are 
shifting the attention from nature as asset to nature as risk.  This goes beyond Hamdouch and 
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Zuindeau’s (2012:430) suggestion that, “a world increasingly subject to risks” is the latest 
changes that have happened to the “concept of sustainable development”.  The argument here 
is that a new way of seeing nature is emerging which is radically different from the one 
evoked by sustainable development. Imagining “nature as risk is hark back to a pre-modern 
conception of human-nature relations which was centred on what nature does to us, rather 
than what we do to nature” (Davoudi, 2012a: 62-63). In the environment versus development 
debate, this can lead to being more concerned about the impact of the environment on 
development (as in adaptation assessment) than the impact of development on the 
environment (as in environmental impact assessment). There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between now and the pre-modern time and that lies in the distinction between 
hazard and risk, as discussed below.    
 
2.3 Nature as risk 
“A spectre is haunting the entire world: but it is not that of communism […] Climate 
change – no more, no less than nature’s payback […] is revealing itself” (Levene, 
2005 cited in Swyngedouw, 2010:214). 
 
People have always been exposed to natural hazards such as earthquakes and erupting 
volcanos. In the pre-modern time these were viewed as divine retributions to which people 
were passively exposed. Human action was incapable of changing these ‘strokes of fate’ 
(WBGU, 2000) decreed from on high by divine forces such as Fortuna - the Roman goddess 
of fate and often translated into English as fortune.  The Enlightenment project sought to 
bring nature as the demonic other under human control by moulding the world to their 
purposes. Fortuna, seen as the enemy of order, had to be tamed. The interventions meant that 
natural hazards which were previously seen as external to and beyond the social realm 
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became increasingly entwined with it. Modernity and its “technoscience turned what was 
nonhuman Nature into something contingent and coincident with human society” (Luke, 
1999:10), and by doing so it transformed hazards into risks. The distinction between the two 
lies in the role of human intervention in nature (Luhmann, 1991). Whereas hazard refers to a 
natural event, risk is an artefact carefully crafted by humans (Dillon, 2008:322).  “Risks are 
made, hazards naturally occur”, as Ulrich Beck (2012: 13-15) puts it.  It is this understanding 
of risk which is at the heart of Beck’s ‘risk society’ and the hallmark of what he calls 
‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck, 1996); an era “when modernity is dealing with problems 
literally of its own making” (Dalby, 2008:445).  Beck argues that, “the basic problems today 
are not of the environment or nature, and not a simple matter of social irresponsibility or lack 
of respect for nature” (cited in Siedman and Alexander, 2001:20) but, of the way in which 
nature is socially interpreted and culturally constructed in late modernity.  Thus, to suggest 
that nature as risk is a social construct does not simply mean that nature reacts to social 
intervention. Rather, it means society forms and shapes the natural (including the climate 
systems) in terms of risk. It is about nature being “figured as a ‘risk’ in and of itself” 
(Baldwin and Stanley, 2013:2).   
 
It is true that some discourses of climate change are similar to those of sustainability and 
highlight its anthropogenic causes and the need for mitigation measures. Some challenge the 
framing of vulnerability and adaptation as a mere environmental problem and put the 
emphasis on the role of social structures in the production and reproduction of such 
vulnerabilities (see for example, Adger et al, 2001). However, these reflexive views are 
increasingly displaced by those that accord agency to nature and render it an independent 
force which is ‘out there’ waiting to strike back, despite “modernity’s proclivity to dominate, 
destroy, manage, cajole or modify Nature” (Baldwin and Stanley, 2013:3).  This externalized 
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and disembodied nature is then blamed for the social and ecological problems that are in fact 
“caused by modernity” and are “integral part of the relations of global neoliberal capitalism” 
(Swyngdouw, 2009: 613).  Wisner et al (2004) trace a similar re-assigning of responsibility 
from human to nature in the early literature on disaster risk. Although since the 1970s, many 
analysts have stressed that disasters (as opposed to hazards) are no not natural and should be 
considered as failed development (O’Brien et al., 2006), “this view remains widespread” 
(Schipper and Pelling, 2006:26).  The dominant climate change discourses reinforce this view 
by bringing back “the wild autogenic otherness of Nature” which was replaced by “the 
anthropogenic systems of ‘the environment’” after the 1960s (Luke, 1997:9)5.  The tamed 
ecosystems are being reimagined as the unruly nature. This engenders a change of priorities 
from safeguarding nature as a resource for the future, to safeguarding the future against 
nature seen as a threat.    
 
To some extent, these are analogous to the narrative of survivalism and its emphasis on: 
limits, projection of a seemingly relentless trajectory, and the suggestion that the fates of 
cities and localities are to be swept up in the global malaise. Note, for example, the early 
discussions on climate change and the argument that, as “climate change affects life support 
systems […] survivalism- the most elemental of human goals and the first duty of all 
governments- is called into serious question” (Wilson 1983:71).   The similarities between 
the two maybe due to the institutional contexts in which they were produced and more 
specifically the predominant role played by science and computer models in constructing and 
representing a particular meaning of nature. In his response to Limits to Growth, Freeman 
challenged the claim to objectivity and neutrality of computer modelling that were used for 
establishing ‘limits’ and argued that,  “The apparent detached neutrality of a computer model 
                                                          
5
 This is not to suggest that any statement of ‘risk’ associated with environmental hazards is necessarily and 
consciously related to an underlying discourse that accords agency to nature. 
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is as illusory as it is persuasive. Any model of any social systems […] involves assumptions 
[…] that are necessarily coloured by the attitudes and values of the individual or groups 
concerned.” (Freeman, 1973:7-8).  Hajer and Versteeg (2011) make a similar point about the 
formation of climate change discourses. Drawing on Miller (2004), they state that until the 
second half of the twentieth century climate was almost synonymous to weather. It signified 
an aggregation of locally specific weather averages which although could cause major 
damage to particular localities, it was not seen as a global risk. This changed radically with 
the rising awareness of global warming. The term climate began to represent “an ontological 
whole, an integrated system” (Miller, 2004: 54). When the debate on climate change started it 
was seen as one of several global effects of environmental problems. After the first World 
Climate Conference in 1979 (organised by the World Meteorological Organisation in 
Geneva) climate became “a theme in its own right” with its own scientific community (Hajer 
and Versteeg, 2011:85) to whom the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
given a unified and consensual voice. Since then, climate change has become the emblematic 
environmental problems. As Whatmore (2008: 1777) suggests, “the term environment is 
being subsumed under the hegemonic imperative of climate change”. With their computer 
models, visualizing graphic and statistical matrices, scientists not only perceive, but also 
perform climate change (Demeritt, 2001). In doing so, they shape a particular understanding 
of it which is increasingly ossified in the narrative of risks and “fused with a pervasive 
apocalyptic imaginary” (Swyngdouw, 2009: 602) which encourages “drastic neomalthusian 
scenarios” (Nordas and Gleditch, 2007:627). In this context, the political question is not just 
who decides but also who imagines the future (Aradau et al, 2008: 152).   
 
One implication of seeing nature as risk is the displacement of the modernist (false) sense of 
certainty and its over-rated confidence in human ingenuity and technology that imbued the 
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Brundtland Report, by the narratives of uncertainty, inevitability and insecurity that are now 
prevalent in all aspects of policy.  This, however, is not to suggest that the modernist quest 
for controlling the seemingly clockwork Universe is abandoned. On the contrary, the risk-
laden discourses of climate change elevate the demand for control, for policing nature and for 
security (see below). A key characteristic of risk, as opposed to danger or hazard, is its 
perceived calculability and controllability by technical experts who are “given pole position 
to define agendas and impose bounding premises a priori on risk discourses” (Lash and 
Wynne, 1994:4). The imaginary of climate change, produced by the scientific community and 
exaggerated by the popular media (see Table 1) evokes the Pascalian
6
 understanding of risk 
as probabilities “by means of which the uncertain future […] is rendered knowable and 
actionable” (Aradau et al, 2008: 150) as long as better forms of calculations, models and 
management techniques are employed.  
 
A corollary to the rising risk-based approaches to environmental issues is the affirmation of 
the 1960s’ outmoded view of urban planning as a technical-rational decision making process 
and a growing use of quantification, calculation and engineering-based modeling in urban 
planning. This may not only undermine the qualitative and judgmental basis of planning 
decisions by conflating ‘matters of facts’ with ‘matters of concerns’ (Latour, 2004), but also 
foreclose political disagreements. It can lead to a politics that “legitimizes itself by means of 
a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge” (Žižek, 2006: 1888) rather than, 
for example, its ideological foundation.  As Pidgeon and Butler (2009) argue, the risk-based 
approaches are articulated not only as technical knowledge practices, but also as political 
rationalities. For example, Pattberg (2012: 623) suggests that through “the agency of nonstate 
actors”, such as investors and financiers, and specific “techniques of governance”, such as 
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 Pascal is said to be the first to invent probability in order to win at gaming but his invention also highlighted 
the value of mathematical ways of translating contingency into risk and “turning numbers into […] policy as 
well as profit” (Dillon, 2013:318).  
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carbon disclosure, “climate change has been manufactured into a specific type of (business) 
risk”.  Thus, risk tools are used not simply to aid decision-making, but as an assemblage of 
government technologies. Drawing on Foucault’s biopolitical framing of risk, Dillon 
(2008:323) contends that by measuring and commodifying our exposure to contingency
7
, 
“risk rules”. It becomes “the rule for the conduct of conduct in a new governmental order of 
securitizing" (ibid:324).  Paradoxical as it may sound, the risk-laden narrative of climate 
change simultaneously evokes pessimism about the apocalyptic future and optimism about 
our ability to securitize it through technologies of risk.  
 
3. Securitisation of nature 
Seeing nature as risk ushers in a deep concern with security. Ironically, our knowledge and 
manipulation of nature to fit it to our purposes and to free us from its hazards seem to have 
led to our greater fear of its risks and, hence, greater demand for security. The more we have 
‘fabricated uncertainties’ (Beck, 1996) the greater our sense of insecurity.  And, the more 
nature is conceived of as a threat to humankind and civilization, the more our relation to it is 
framed in terms of safety and security. In these ‘ecologies of fear’ (Davis, 1999a) the risk 
society becomes intertwined with the security society.  Although the discourses of 
(in)security may be seen as an accentuated discourse of vulnerability (Barnett, 2003), not all 
vulnerabilities are elevated to the status of insecurities. Defining and selecting what is at risk 
and what vulnerabilities should be upgraded to insecurity are contested political acts, even 
though they are often masqueraded as technical-rational risk assessments.  
 
Like risk, security is socially produced but, “whereas risk threatens, security promises” 
(Zedner, 2003:176). It gives people both a sense of being safe and the means to achieve that.  
                                                          
7
 Within the biopolitical framework contingency is not simply uncertainty, it is the condition of emergent life    
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It promises a condition in which risk is non-existent, neutralised, avoided (ibid) or 
underwritten (Dillon, 2008). While non-existence of risk is utopian, the desire for 
neutralization, avoidance of risk provides the rationale for relentless pursuit of security.  Risk 
and security, therefore, feed from one another in the sense that keeping up the demand for 
security requires maintaining a heightened sense of risk. As Dillon (2008:326) suggests “risk 
satisfies the desire for security by upping up the ante and thereby massively increasing 
exposure to contingency, which it further translates into new risks”. Attraction of such 
circularity has led to a large number of social and environmental problems, including climate 
change, to be increasingly articulated as security problems (Spitzer, 1987). With regard to the 
environment, the axis of debate is swinging from development versus nature to the question 
of which security should take precedence. For example, the debate over energy crops is 
turning into a competition about which security is more important: food or energy security
8
. 
In many respects, this is an anathema to traditional environmental agendas because 
increasingly food security trumps biodiversity, energy security trumps renewable energy, and 
climate security trumps sustainability.  The securitization of nature, therefore, reflects and 
reinforces the wider and dominating global discourses of securitization (Aradau, 2009).  
 
The recasting of climate change as a security problem became prevalent following the 
Toronto Conference in 1988
9
 which focused on the ‘dangers’ of climate change and 
announced that its “ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war" 
(cited in Barnett, 2001:4), an analogy later used by Smil (1997).  Since then, there has been a 
growing literature that frames climate change in terms of security (for a full review see 
Barnett, 2001; Barnett and Adger, 2007) with some using belligerent language similar to the 
above.  A key milestone in the securitisation of climate change was its inclusion in the 
                                                          
8
 I am grateful to Philip Lowe who raised these points in an email exchange in May 2011.   
9
 The conference: The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security was the first international 
meeting on climate change in which scientists and political actors were brought together.  
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meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 17 April 2007 (Nordas and 
Gleditsch, 2007) by the UK and on 20 July 2011 by Germany (Oels, 2013).  The latter led to 
the UNSC Presidential Declaration that, “possible adverse effects of climate change may, in 
the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security” (UNSC, 
2011:32).  Of the various referent objects that dominate climate security discourse, cities and 
nations have a prominent position as discussed below.  
 
3.1 National security and climate as a ‘threat multiplier’ 
  “During our decades of experience in the U.S. military, we have addressed many 
national security challenges, from […] deterrence of the Soviet nuclear threat during 
the Cold War to terrorism and extremism in recent years. Global climate change 
presents a new […] type of national security challenge […], it is important that the 
U.S. military begin planning to address these potentially devastating effects.” (CNA, 
2007: 1). 
The above quote is an example of a growing trend to recast climate change problems as 
national security problems which in turn call for military planning.  The quote is from the 
report: National Security and the Threat of Climate Change published by the CNA 
Corporation, a think tank in the United States and produced by a Military Advisory Board 
consisting of eleven top retired admirals and generals. One of whom is cited to suggest that 
climate change acts as a “threat multiplier” (CNA, 2007:6 emphasis added) and “will provide 
the conditions that will extend the war on terror” (ibid: 17).  Two years later, the UN General 
Assembly Report confirmed the framing of climate change as a “threat multiplier” (UN GA, 
2009:2).  In 2011, a special meeting of the UNSC was convened to consider the possibility of 
expanding “its mission to keep the peace in an era of climate change” by introducing a new 
‘environmental peacekeeping force’ with ‘green helmets’ (instead of blue) who “could step 
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into conflicts caused by shrinking resources” (The Guardian, 2011). The suggestion was that, 
"The security council should join the general assembly in recognizing climate change as a 
threat to international peace and security; it is a threat as great as nuclear proliferation or 
global terrorism" (ibid). Adding to these sentiments, the UK's Climate and Energy Security 
Envoy to Durban Submit (2011) posted a note on the website of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office explaining “why climate change can be a threat multiplier”10. 
Evidence about similar development in other nations about similar development in other 
nations is provided by Wisner et al (2007).   
 
This heightened call for national security can turn the conflict over the distributive 
implications of climate change into a new geopolitics in which nation states may withdraw 
“into the safe haven of territoriality” (Bauman, 1998: 117) and consider military strategies as 
acceptable responses to the conflicts over who is exposed to what climate risk, and who has 
access to what climate security.  At the centre of all this is the perceived threat of ‘climate 
refugees’, an emotive term which first appeared in June 2009 in the draft text, prepared by the 
Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
11
 and  introduced into climate 
negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Warner, 
2012:1065).  Although it was dropped from the subsequent negotiations and official texts, 
concerns about migration and displacement remained  on the agenda, partly due to the efforts 
of “science and advocacy” especially the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, 2007 and the 
Stern Review, 2006 (Warner, 2012:1068). The latter indicates that by 2050 there will be some 
200 million additional “environmental refugees” (quoted in Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007:632) 
with a potential for conflict in host communities.  While the dystopian narratives can be 
beneficial in attracting greater attention and even commitment to global humanitarian issues, 
                                                          
10 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/climate-change/priorities/global-security/  (Accessed 5/8/2012) 
11
 This is a subsidiary body created by the COP 13 (Bali) Action Plan in 2007, whose intention was to pave the 
ground for agreement on the successor of Kyoto Protocol  (Warner, 2012: 1065) 
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it can also lead to “denial, paralysis, apathy or even perverse reactive behaviour” (Hulme, 
2007:818) including the portrayal of “the vulnerable –such as climate refugees- as a threat to 
national security” (Bettini, 2013 drawing on Hartmann, 2010).  
 
The discourses of climate change are increasingly engulfed by and reinforce the dominant 
global discourse of securitization (Aradau, 2009). While in the early 2000s climate change 
was competing with terrorism as to which one represents the greatest threat to the established 
western way of life (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007), today that competition seems to be over 
because climate change is now portrayed as a condition for terrorism; as a ‘threat multiplier’; 
it is construed as the ‘mother’ of all threats.  Similar forms of geopolitics became prevalent at 
the time of crisis in the natural resources in the 1970s.  Then, it was advocated that, “whoever 
who controls world resources control the world in a way that mere occupation of territory 
cannot match” (Barnet, 1980:17). Today, as the Arctic is melting, some of the most powerful 
countries, such as the US, UK and Russia, are positioning themselves to have a larger share 
of the Arctic oil reserves. The environmental morality which surrounded the discourse of 
‘endangered polar bears’ is fast becoming sabotaged by economic rationality and geopolitics, 
reaffirming that nature-for-nature sake has remained subaltern to nature-as-storehouse of 
resources, and that anthropocentric and utilitarian view of the world continues to prevail.  
  
3.2 Climate change and resilient urbanism     
“We are not a security guard company: We sell a concept of security”.  
 
The above statement by the President of a security firm in the United States (cited in Davis, 
1990b: 250) indicates that security is not just a means to an end (i.e. protection from risk), but 
an end in itself. It is a positive good, “sold as a desirable product in and of its own right” 
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(Zedner. 2003: 160). The pursuit of security is as much about security providers seeking 
raison d’etres for their operations as it is about risk prevention.  As a commodity with a 
price, climate security becomes factored into both private suppliers’ (notably the insurance 
companies) and urban governance’s strategic decisions and calculations. For urban 
governance climate security is now a highly sought-after commodity which competes with 
other commodities in terms of economic and social costs. As Sassen (2011) suggests, security 
is increasingly urbanized. Cities are in competition with one another in positioning 
themselves on the world’s league tables of ‘safe places’.  London, for example, boasts to be 
“a safe place for business” (GLA, 2010:109).  The price to pay for the pursuit of a safe utopia 
is the ever expanding landscape of securitisation which now covers a wide range of risks 
from crime and natural hazards to terrorism and cyber-attack. Climate change is a relatively 
newcomer to this terrain but, the more nature- as- asset discourse is subverted by nature- as- 
risk, the greater the inclusion of climate into urban security packages.  In the market-
utilitarian view of nature (mentioned in section 2.1 above), this also signals a change of what 
is perceived as the prime commodity.  In the city marketing strategies of the mid-20
th
 century 
the prime commodity was nature itself with all its goods and services.  Now, the prime 
commodity is the security against nature and its threating, dystopian prospect.  Climate 
security in terms of both material goods (such a flood defences) and symbolic goods (such as 
flood warning systems) is now packaged with other securities and placed in the competitive 
global market of ‘safe cities’. So, the Mayor of London reassures the corporate world of 
business that “London will be weather-proof” (GLA, 2010:6); that, “London is less 
vulnerable (to climate change) than some of its principal world city competitors” referring to 
New York and Tokyo (GLA, 2010: 109). Similar claims are made by the Netherlands where 
businesses and investors are reassured that the flood defences of her port cities, such as 
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Rotterdam, will be able to withstand sea level rises of significant magnitudes (Meyer et al, 
2012).   
 
The race to the ‘safe city’ has profound distributive, environmental and democratic 
implications.  Hodson and Marvin (2011), for example, refer to the emergence of a new 
‘urban ecological security’ where cities, such as London, New York and Shanghai, are 
creating safe havens of segregated infrastructural security with important distributional 
implications (Bulkeley, 2010).   The intricate entwining of the urban age with the age of man 
construes cites as key strategic sites of not only “military, economic, cultural and 
representational struggle” (Graham, 2002:589), but also ecological struggle.  A clear example 
is urban surveillance practices (Coaffee et al, 2008) which have now penetrated into all 
aspects of urban governance ranging from monitoring of crimes and civic disobediences to 
‘environmental incivilities’12 and energy consumption behaviours. Urban securitisation has 
fully embraced climate risk.  Despite this, the securitisation literature has remained divided 
between two main camps: those who focus on urban security and leave out climate change 
(see for example Special Collection of IJURR, 2002) and those who focus on climate security 
and leave out military urbanism (see for example Special Issue of Geoforum, 2013). 
 
In the scuritisation turn, one common corollary is the concept of resilience.  The growing 
avalanche of resilient cities literatures by international organisations (such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations), national and urban governments, academics and think tanks (notably 
the Stockholm Resilience Alliance) are ‘selling the concept of resilience’ (to paraphrase the 
quote that heads this section) as the key strategy for urban securitisation for a whole range of 
perceived risks, from terrorism to climate change.  They are creating a new form of urbanism 
                                                          
12
 A term used to refer to activities such as littering, flyposting  and graffiti (Ellaway et al., 2009) 
20 
 
which can be summed up as ‘resilient urbanism’, whose defining characteristic is not so 
much about long term adaptive capacity building but, short term emergency responses.  A 
large body of resilient cities literature is preoccupied with an out-dated engineering 
understanding of the resilience (Fϋnfgeld and McEvoy, 2012; Davoudi, 2012b; Davoudi et 
al., 2013).  Therefore, a speedy return to an elusive equilibrium has become the goal of many 
off-the-shelf resilience building toolkits.  They consider resilient urbanism as the ability of 
cities to bounce back from external shocks into ‘normality’ without questioning the 
desirability of ‘the normal’ (Davoudi, 2012b). From this perspective, radical transformation 
(which underpins evolutionary resilience of complex adaptive systems) is considered not as a 
desirable outcome but, as a system failure.  Here, resilient urbanism is often defined by the 
physical stability of the urban infrastructure.  Climate events are construed as sudden, 
external shocks imposed by nature, rather than slow burn effects of urbanisation and its 
social-ecological processes. Such a view privileges reactionary responses in the form of 
emergency planning with an emphasis on the traditional disaster risk management practices 
of ‘prevent, prepare, respond, and recover’. This linear, equilibrium-based understanding of 
resilient urbanism is a far cry from Holling’s ecological (1973) and evolutionary (Holling and 
Gunderson, 2002) resilience. The latter rejects the existence of systems equilibrium 
altogether and considers nature not as orderly, mechanical and reasonably predictable (the 
clockwork Universe), but as complex, contingent and inherently unpredictable.  This 
advanced understanding of resilience is rarely found in resilient cities literature. Their over-
emphasis on short term emergency responses pre-empts the potential for long term adaptive 
capacity building and the pursuit of transformative trajectories (Davoudi, et al., 2013). In the 
caldron of this limited view of resilient urbanism, creative potentials become stifled by 
formulaic procedures. The need for urgent action overrides the demand for inclusivity and 
legitimizes the evacuation of ‘the political’; the points to which we return in the next section.   
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4. From the postpoltics of hope to the postpoltics of fear 
Contrary to the rhetoric of sustainable development which imbued environmental discourses 
with optimism of win-win solutions, the language of climate change discerns a sense of 
pessimism (Blowers et al, 2009).  The rhetoric of sustainable development was projecting 
images of a safe and sustainable future for humans and non-humans, while the dominant 
discourses of climate change are conjuring up images of a future defined by the inevitability 
of climate risks. Analyses of the media representations of climate change in the UK confirm 
how such pessimism is reproduced and exaggerated by media headlines (see Table 1) in 
which “fear, misery and doom” are prevalent (Boykoff, 2008:561). The environmental 
apocalyptic imaginaries “leave behind any hope of rebirth or renewal”. They advocate “an 
unquenchable fascination with being on the verge of an end that never comes” (Jay, 1994:33) 
but, hangs over humanity’s head like the sword of Damocles.  They “preach an apocalypse 
without redemption” (Swyngedouw, 2010:218). 
  
IT IS THE END OF THE WORLD…MAINLY FOR CHILDREN – The Express 17 January 
2000  
HOW THE WORLD WILL END – Daily Mail, 28 December 2002 
WAVE IT GOODBYE: RAGING FLOODS COULD SWAMP OUR CITIES WITHIN A 
LIFETIME –The Mirror, 16 September 2002 
Pentagon warns Bush of apocalyptic climate change by 2020 – The Observer, 22 February 
2004   
WATER WARS- Armed forces are put on standby to tackle threat of wars over water - The 
Independent, 28 February 2006 
We have less than 100 months to act – Prince Charles, March 2009   
 
Table 1: Media headlines on climate change 
Source: Adapted from: Boykoff (2008:561), Swyngedouw (2010:218) and Wisner et al 
(2007:12)   
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More importantly, Blowers et al (2009:313) argue that climate change has led to a “shift from 
an environmental politics of cooperation and consensus” which underpinned sustainability 
“to a politics of securitisation”. This is a kind of politics that centres on instantiating a regime 
of knowledge/power relations that capitalises upon crafting, circulating and techno-managing 
risk.  However, the politics of securitisation is also consensual politics because it crowds out 
‘the political’ and prevents the politicisation of particulars (Mouffe, 2005) in the name of 
security.  The de-politicisation of climate change is assisted by the foregrounding of: 
calculative practices (Miller, 2008; While, 2012), technical-rational risk assessments, and 
managerial approaches to urban planning.  However, what distinguishes the consensual 
postpolitics of sustainability from that of securitisation is their different rhetoric. For 
sustainability the rhetoric is centred on the promise of a bright win-win future; for climate 
change it is placed on the threat of an apocalyptic future. The former instils hope, the latter 
imbues fear. Although postpolitics of fear does not eradicate contestation, it can lead to 
elimination of “genuine political space for disagreement” (Swyngedouw, 2009: 609) and for 
radical alternatives.  This is not to suggest that depoliticisation is a neutral process. On the 
contrary, it is highly political and often results in “the affirmation of the dominant relations 
and practices” (Bettini, 2013:69).  The postpolitics of fear call for “the suspension of 
democratic safeguards and the uncoupling of checks and balances (Bluhdorn and Welsh, 
2007: 191) in the name of urgency, emergency, resilience, risk and security. These pervasive 
idioms provoke strong emotions that can legitimise extraordinary exercise of power. They 
perform three themes, as suggested by Calhoun (2004). 
 
Firstly, they “naturalize what are in fact products of human action” (Calhoun, 2004: 376). 
Climate events are signified as act of nature in the same way as famine was once seen as the 
consequence of drought, rather than factors such as poverty, inequality and economic 
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colonisation (Davis, 2001). Žižek (2010:328) refers to this as “(re)normalisation” of 
ecological problem in mainstream policy, which reinterprets climate change “as simple fact; 
as just another part of ‘carry on as usual’”. Secondly, they “represent as sudden, 
unpredictable and short-term what are usually gradually developing, predictable and enduring 
clusters of events and interactions” (Calhoun, 2004: 376). Climate events are seen as an 
unpredictable, abnormal and sudden act of nature which is challenging the global order of 
which these events are exceptions rather than outcomes. Thirdly, they “simultaneously locate 
in particular settings what is in fact […] produced […] by global forces, and dislocate the 
standpoint of observation […] to a view from nowhere” (ibid).  Flooding in Bangladesh 
becomes a local and natural emergency that is observed across the globe but, disconnected 
from the global social-ecological processes of which it is an outcome. Those affected by it are 
portrayed as unfortunate victims of a ‘natural disaster’ with no historical or contextual link to 
the social-ecological relations that originate vulnerability (Manzo, 2010).  By provoking 
urgency and emergency, the language of risk and security can renounce or displace social 
conflicts and “foreclose a proper political framing” (Swyngedouw, 2010:2019). They can 
ostracize the arenas in which questions about justice, fairness and conflicts can be raised.  In 
the postpoitlics of fear, technical fixes (such as nuclear power) which were off the 
sustainability agenda, can be justified in the name of energy security with little political 
questioning (While, 2012). Critiques of mainstreaming resilience in all aspects of urban 
policy and translating the concept from ecology to society uncritically have raised similar 
questions such as, “resilience from what to what, and who gets to decide?” (Davoudi and 
Porter, 2012:331).   
 
5. Conclusion  
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There are two terms that have come to define the twenty first century. The one that we hear 
often is the ‘urban age’ and the one that we hear rarely is the ‘age of man’. Both are, 
however, closely related. It was on the path to urbanisation that we paved the Earth, 
retrofitted nature to fit our purposes, and created the Anthropocene. What has made this 
process materially possible and ethically acceptable is the anthropocentric view of the world 
that has prevailed since the Enlightenment era. A striking manifestation of the contingencies 
of human-nature relations is the anthropogenic climate change. Despite this, the increasingly 
dominating discourses of climate change tend to accord agency to an independent nature 
which is striking back and putting humans at risk. This view of nature as risk is side-lining 
the sustainability discourses which portray nature as finite asset. It shifts the attentions from 
what we do to nature to what nature does to us; from safeguarding nature for urban futures to 
securing urban futures against nature. Furthermore, the risk-laden language of climate change 
ushers in a deep concern with security. Thus, the hallmark of the reflexive modernity is 
becoming not just the risk society, as Beck suggests, but also the security society. The 
recasting of climate change problems as security problems reflects and reinforces 
securitisation as the hegemonic discourse of our time. Feeding from each other, risk and 
security can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary measures, and lead to 
practices which are otherwise indefensible. They can create imaginaries of fear which 
renounce social conflict, foreclose politics, and crowd out descending voices. They can 
suspend democratic safeguards in the name of urgency, emergency and resilience. The 
framing of climate events as sudden natural shocks can redirect the attentions away from long 
term capacity building and social transformation towards short term emergency planning, that 
is increasingly placed at the centre of debate on resilient urbanism. More alarmingly, the 
perception of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ may lead to the justification of 
exceptional measures as the undisputed and necessary action.  Such a slippery slope to 
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potential militarisation is a reminder of what Mouffe (2005) considers as the dangers of 
succumbing to liberal rationalism as the infallible and omnipresent form of consensual 
politics.  
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